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Abstract
■ Every day we make attributions about how our actions and
the actions of others cause consequences in the world around
us. It is unknown whether we use the same implicit process in
attributing causality when observing othersʼ actions as we do
when making our own. The aim of this research was to inves-
tigate the neural processes involved in the implicit sense of
agency we form between actions and effects, for both our own
actions and when watching othersʼ actions. Using an interval
estimation paradigm to elicit intentional binding in self-made
and observed actions, we measured the EEG responses indicative
of anticipatory processes before an action and the ERPs in re-
sponse to the sensory consequence. We replicated our previous
findings that we form a sense of implicit agency over our own
and othersʼ actions. Crucially, EEG results showed that tones
caused by either self-made or observed actions both resulted in
suppression of the N1 component of the sensory ERP, with no
difference in suppression between consequences caused by
observed actions compared with self-made actions. Furthermore,
this N1 suppression was greatest for tones caused by observed
goal-directed actions rather than non-action or non-goal-related
visual events. This suggests that top–down processes act upon
the neural responses to sensory events caused by goal-directed
actions in the same way for events caused by the self or those
made by other agents. ■
INTRODUCTION
Understanding our own and othersʼ interactions with the
world is a vital part of our day-to-day existence. We initiate
our own movements to reach a goal and also watch others
initiate their own movements to interact with the environ-
ment. Our own movements may include pressing a button
to open a door, or we may watch someone else struggle
with gripping a lid to open a jar. For our own movements,
we form a sense of agency over the events that occur as a
result of our own actions. We form the idea that we
“caused” an event to happen through our movements
(Gallagher, 2000). Recent investigations have suggested
that we also attribute agency over othersʼ actions in a sim-
ilar way as we do for our own (Poonian & Cunnington,
2013; Sato, 2008). However, it is still poorly understood
how the brain integrates our own and othersʼ actions with
their relevant sensory consequences to give us a coherent
perceptual experience.
A recent theory has suggested that sense of agency in-
volves two levels of attributions, an implicit “feeling of
agency” and amore conscious judgment of agency (Synofzik,
Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008). Implicit agency is hypothesized
to relate to the causal association we make between our
own actions and their sensory consequences (Synofzik
et al., 2008). An indirect measure of this association in-
volves tasks where voluntary self-made actions and sensory
consequences are perceived as occurring closer together in
time when actions and effects are paired together (Moore
& Obhi, 2012; Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). This
perceived temporal shift of the action and consequence
toward each other is thought to be because of the action
and consequence being “bound together” in time (Haggard
et al., 2002; for a review, see Moore & Obhi, 2012). This
phenomenon, termed intentional binding, has also recently
beenmeasured when others execute actions, including just
watching othersʼ actions on a screen or in real life (Poonian
& Cunnington, 2013; Wohlschlager, Engbert, & Haggard,
2003) or when a personʼs action is part of a shared action
with another (Obhi &Hall, 2011a; Strother, House, &Obhi,
2010). Although the association between movements and
consequences has previously been demonstrated for both
our own and othersʼ actions, it remains to be seen whether
the binding that occurs when another agent performs an
action involves the same cognitive and brain processes
found when we execute our own actions.
The causal attribution we make between actions and
consequences is hypothesized to occur through predictive
processes (Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995). These
processes include predictions that are made when plan-
ning an action (David, Newen, & Vogeley, 2008; Synofzik
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et al., 2008) as well as a comparison that occurs between
the predicted sensory effect and the actual sensory effect
(Blakemore, Frith,&Wolpert, 2001;Wolpert&Ghahramani,
2000). This comparison is thought to occur through effer-
ence copies or corollary discharges of the movement
(von Holst, 1954; Sperry, 1950). These two aspects of
predictive forward models, the prediction about an action
(Wolpert et al., 1995) and the comparison of the predicted
effects to the actual effect (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith,
2000), are thought to contribute to the causal associations
we make between our actions and their sensory con-
sequences (David et al., 2008). Recently it has been sug-
gested that a similar predictive process is involved when
we observe othersʼ goal-directed actions; that is, we pre-
dict the goals, intentions, and consequences of othersʼ
actions through an internal representation of the observed
action (Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007). In a similar way as
is hypothesized for our own actions, it is also thought that
we compare the actual consequences of an observed
action to the effects that are predicted (Kilner et al., 2007).
Investigations into the neural processes associated
with actions and their sensory consequences have pre-
dominantly focused on two EEG components. The first
examines the neural activity leading up to a voluntary
action representing the planning and preparatory activity
before the initiation of a movement (Libet, Gleason,
Wright, & Pearl, 1983; Deecke, Scheid, & Kornhube,
1969). The second examines the neural processing of
sensory consequences caused by self-made actions (Aliu,
Houde, & Nagarajan, 2009; Martikainen, Kaneko, & Hari,
2005). These components have not only been measured
during action-effect tasks to investigate the processing of
actions and their consequences independently but also
used as evidence to indicate the role predictive processes
have when associating our actions with their correspond-
ing effect.
Predictions about our own actions are thought to
occur through motor commands from activity in premotor
areas, such as the SMA (David et al., 2008). Neural activity
before the execution of an action has previously been
found in the SMA and pre-SMA (Cunnington,Windischberger,
& Moser, 2005; Ikeda et al., 1999; Cunnington, Bradshaw,
& Iansek, 1996; Deiber, Ibanez, Sadato, & Hallett, 1996;
Ikeda, Luders, Burgess, & Shibasaki, 1992). In EEG tasks
where self-made actions are executed, a slow-wave nega-
tive potential, known as the readiness potential (RP),
begins approximately 2 sec before a movement and rises
to a peak just before movement onset (Libet et al., 1983;
Deecke et al., 1969).
Direct links between activity in SMA with attributions
of self-agency have recently been made (Kuhn, Brass, &
Haggard, 2012; Miele, Wager, Mitchell, & Metcalfe, 2011;
Moore, Ruge, Wenke, Rothwell, & Haggard, 2010;
Haggard & Clark, 2003). During implicit agency tasks, dis-
ruption of the SMA during preparation of an action
results in less action-effect binding (Moore et al., 2010;
Haggard & Clark, 2003). Therefore, it could be suggested
that slow-wave activity from SMA before an action event
is involved in the attribution of agency we make between
actions and effects.
Predictions about othersʼ actions are hypothesized to
involve mapping of the observed action onto areas that
are also involved when a person executes their own
movements (Kilner et al., 2007; Rizzolatti et al., 1996).
Investigations using slow-wave potentials have examined
activity before the presentation of another personʼs hand
grasping an object. During this task, a contingent nega-
tive variation (CNV) was elicited before the presentation
of the moving hand (Kilner, Vargas, Duval, Blakemore, &
Sirigu, 2004). This suggests that the higher motor areas
are active before observing anotherʼs actions (Kilner
et al., 2004). The CNV is thought to index the anticipation
of an upcoming stimulus (Brunia & van Boxtel, 2001),
and during action observation, it is hypothesized to index
activity from motor areas that are activated within the
action observation network, again because of predictions
about the observed action (Kilner et al., 2004). It there-
fore appears that slow-wave activity may be present before
both our own actions and when watching othersʼ actions;
however, it is yet to be determined whether this activity
is related to the attribution of agency for our own and
othersʼ actions.
The comparison between predicted and actual con-
sequences of an action is also thought to contribute to
the association between actions and consequences. In
the comparator model, when the predicted and actual
consequence match, we infer agency to ourselves. If
there is a mismatch, we do not infer ourselves as the
cause of a consequence (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith,
2002). Investigations into the prediction of consequences
have focused on particular components of the sensory
ERP. Reductions in the amplitude of the N1 component
have been found for sensory effects caused by self-made
actions (i.e., self-made effects; Bass, Jacobsen, & Schroger,
2008; Martikainen et al., 2005) in both the auditory domain
(Hughes, Desantis, & Waszak, 2013; Knolle, Schroger, &
Kotz, 2013; Baess, Horvath, Jacobsen, & Schroger, 2011;
Lange, 2011; Aliu et al., 2009) and the visual domain
(Gentsch, Kathmann, & Schutz-Bosbach, 2012; Gentsch
& Schutz-Bosbach, 2011; Hughes & Waszak, 2011). Even
greater decreases in amplitude have been found for self-
made consequences that were predictable compared with
self-made effects that were not (Hughes et al., 2013; Knolle
et al., 2013; Gentsch et al., 2012). The decrease in N1
amplitude is thought to occur because of top–down pre-
dictions from the motor system suppressing the activity
of the auditory cortex (Aliu et al., 2009). Many authors have
concluded that the N1 suppression during action-effect
tasks provides evidence that we process the consequences
of our own actions through predictions within an internal
model of action (Hughes et al., 2013; Aliu et al., 2009; Bass
et al., 2008).
In relation to agency, greater ratings of agency and
greater N1 suppression has been found for sensory effects
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that were subliminally predictable for both action-related
(Gentsch & Schutz-Bosbach, 2011) and non-action-related
stimuli (Gentsch et al., 2012). The authors concluded that
N1 suppression was evidence for top–down predictions
about the sensory consequence and suggest that this atten-
uation plays a part in the conscious experience of agency
(Gentsch et al., 2012; Gentsch & Schutz-Bosbach, 2011).
Although these tasks investigated unconscious processing
of agency, subjective ratings of agency were measured
using an explicit judgment of causation and not by behav-
iorally measuring the temporal association between actions
and effects, thought to index implicit agency, as assessed
during intentional binding tasks.
Inferring causality for other agentsʼ actions can also be
measured either implicitly (Poonian & Cunnington, 2013;
Obhi & Hall, 2011b) or explicitly (Sato, 2008, 2009), sim-
ilar to agency measures for self-made actions. In both
types of tasks, the causal attribution between othersʼ actions
and effects are hypothesized to involve predictions about
the goal, intentions, and consequences of another agentʼs
actions (Poonian & Cunnington, 2013; Sato, 2008). It
remains to be seen whether the attribution of agency we
form for othersʼ actions is also indexed by similar brain
mechanisms as found when we attribute causality over our
own actions.
Very few investigations have examined whether the
attenuation of the sensory ERP for self-made actions also
occurs when watching another agent perform an action.
Using a task where tones were thought to be caused by
another person, no difference in N1 amplitude was found
for those tones that were judged to be caused by the self
compared with those that were judged to be caused by
another (Kuhn et al., 2011). Similarly N1 suppression has
been found for tones that occurred as a result of a joint
action (Loehr, 2013). Another avenue of research has
examined tasks that combine observation of biological
actions with an auditory consequence. It has been found
that watching visual lip movements that are combined
with auditory speech sounds result in suppression of
early components of the auditory ERP (Stekelenburg &
Vroomen, 2007; van Wassenhove, Grant, & Poeppel,
2005). This multisensory integration of auditory and visual
events extends to other biological motion tasks such
as clapping or tapping an object (Stekelenburg, Maes,
Van Gool, Sitskoorn, & Vroomen, 2013; Stekelenburg &
Vroomen, 2007). It is suggested that the N1 suppression
in these tasks is because of internal predictions about the
expected outcome of the biological action (Stekelenburg
& Vroomen, 2012; Arnal, Morillon, Kell, & Giraud, 2009;
van Wassenhove et al., 2005). However, the suppression
found for consequences of othersʼ biological actions has
never been linked to causal attributions that we implicitly
make between othersʼ actions and effects as can be mea-
sured in intentional binding.
Therefore the aim of this research was to investigate
the neural processes involved in the causal attribution
made between actions and effects when sensory events
are caused by a self-made action or an observed action.
In Experiment 1, we investigated two separate EEG com-
ponents while performing an implicit agency task: the
activity before the onset of an executed or observed
action and the ERP response to the sensory consequence
of the action. If implicit agency in observed and self-made
actions does indeed arise from the same underlying
neural process, then we would expect to find similar pre-
action activity before the onset of an action (self-made or
observed) and similar suppression of early components
of the sensory ERP for each action. In a second experi-
ment, we investigated whether the suppression of the
N1 component was related specifically to an observed
agent executing a goal-directed action rather than a
non-action or non-goal-related visual event. To date, this
is the first research to directly investigate the neural pro-
cesses involved in intentional binding for both self-made
and observed actions.
EXPERIMENT 1
Methods
Participants
Twenty right-handed participants (seven men, age range =
18–29 years, mean = 23.5 years) with no known neuro-
logical disease or psychiatric conditions provided written
informed consent to participate in this event-related EEG
experiment. One data set was removed from further anal-
ysis after a failed recording session. Two further data sets
were rejected for failing to reach the threshold for included
trials following the EEG artifact rejection (artifact rejection
threshold = ±120 μV, minimum 80 trials included). All
analyses were conducted on the remaining 17 data sets.
The study was approved by the University of Queensland
medical research ethics committee (UQ Project No.
2008000703).
Procedure
To investigate the preaction/stimulus activity and the audi-
tory ERPs in an implicit agency task, participants completed
an interval estimation paradigm previously known to elicit
intentional binding in observed and self-made actions
(Poonian & Cunnington, 2013; Humphreys & Buehner,
2010). All trials began with a white fixation-cross presented
centrally, whereas auditory stimuli were presented via
two speakers on either side of the computer screen. All
stimuli were presented, and responses were recorded
using Cogent software (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent).
Participants completed three separate conditions (Fig-
ure 1). In control conditions, participants were presented
with a 150-msec auditory tone (440 Hz sine wave, sample
rate = 44,100 Hz, bit rate = 16) created using MATLAB
software (Mathworks, Natick, MA). After a pseudorandom
delay of 500–1500 msec (varying by intervals of 100 msec),
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another identical auditory tone was presented. After
1000 msec, participants were prompted on screen to
recreate the stimulus interval by holding down the space
bar with their right index finger for the length of time that
they perceived the interval between the start of the first
tone and the start of the second tone to have lasted.
In action conditions, participants were required to
make a key press using their right index finger at a time
of their choosing once the trial had started. After a pseudo-
random interval (500–1500 msec), the 150-msec auditory
tone was presented. When prompted, participants were
required to recreate the perceived interval between their
own key press and the onset of the tone.
In observe conditions, a video was presented of another
person performing a key press. The video was created from
a set of 37 bitmap images presented in rapid succession
(duration = 1300 msec). Throughout the video, a white
keyboard was shown in front of a black background. The
video sequence involved a right hand appearing from the
top right hand of the screen (Frame 5), reaching over to
press the space bar on the keyboard (Frame 19), then
moving back the way it came and leaving via the right side
of the screen (Frame 36). The auditory click of the key
press was also presented to coincide with the key press.
The 150-msec tone was presented at a pseudorandom
interval between 500 and 1500 msec after the fully de-
pressed key press image was presented (Frame 19). When
prompted, participants were required to recreate the inter-
val between the observed key press, the time at which the
key was fully depressed and the onset of the auditory tone.
In previous action-effect tasks, a movement-only con-
dition is included to subtract out movement-related activ-
ity from the auditory ERP. As all of our tone stimuli were
presented at least 500 msec after a movement had been
executed, any motor contamination in the auditory ERP
would be negligible; therefore, we did not collect a sep-
arate movement-only condition.
Each of the three conditions consisted of 132 trials,
which were presented in separate blocks of 11 trials each.
Blocks were presented in a pseudorandom order and
counterbalanced between participants.
Behavioral Analysis
To measure binding, stimulus intervals were calculated as
the difference between the time of the first event (first
tone, self-made key press, or observed key press in the
respective conditions) and the onset of the subsequent
tone (500–1500 msec). These were then compared with
response intervals, which were calculated as the time be-
tween the participantsʼ downward key press and time of
the upward release of the response key.
Reproduction errors were calculated as the difference
between the stimulus interval and the response interval
for each trial. Mean reproduction errors for all conditions
across all participants were calculated. Negative repro-
duction errors indicate that participants perceived the
interval between the first event and the tone to be shorter
than it was (underestimate). A positive reproduction error
indicated that participants perceived the stimulus interval
to be longer than it was (overestimate). Mean reproduction
errors for the 17 participants whose data were included in
the EEG analysis were compared using a one-way repeated-
measures ANOVA with the factor of Condition (control,
action, observe).
EEG Acquisition
EEG recordings were made using a BioSemi ActiveTwo
systemwith 64 Ag/AgCl electrodes (BioSemi B.V, Amsterdam,
Netherlands), placed according to the extended inter-
national 10–20 system. Data were sampled at a rate of
1024 Hz and analyzed offline using BESA software (BESA
GmBH, Grafelfing, Germany); to calculate all average ERPs,
an in-house software package was used to extract peak
amplitudes of components. EOG recordings were mea-
sured using separate Ag/AgCl electrodes that were posi-
tioned above and below the left eye for vertical EOG and
Figure 1. Procedure for
interval estimation binding task.
In each condition, the first
event consisted of either a
tone (A), self-made button press
(B), or observed button press
(C). After a pseudorandom
interval (500–1500 msec), a
tone was presented. Participants
were required to recreate the
interval between the first event
and tone by holding down a
button for the length of the
estimated interval.
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adjacent to the outer canthus of each eye for horizontal
EOG. Recordings of reference mastoids were also taken.
EEG Analysis
EEG analysis consisted of referencing the raw EEG data
to linked mastoid electrodes, across all data sets, includ-
ing all conditions and electrodes. Blink artifacts were
corrected for each participant using a filter, based on
spatial topography (Berg & Scherg, 1994). Low-pass (40 Hz)
and high-pass filters (0.05 Hz) were applied to all data.
The high-pass filter in particular was set very low (0.05 Hz =
20 sec cycle) to retain slow-wave activity associated with
preaction potentials but to attenuate slower baseline drift.
Once data had been preprocessed, two types of epochs
were created: preaction potentials and auditory ERPs.
Epochs for preaction potentials began at 1500 msec before
the onset of the first event and continued to 500 msec
after the first event. Preaction epochs were baseline-
corrected using a time window of 1500–1400 msec before
first event onset. Epochs for auditory ERPs began at
500 msec before tone onset to 2000 msec after tone
onset. These were then baseline-corrected using a time
window between 100 and 0 msec before tone onset.
Epochs were rejected if they contained artifacts caused by
poor signal or movement (artifact rejection threshold =
±120 μV), with each data set needing to contain at least
80 artifact-free epochs per condition. Of the remaining
17 data sets, the preaction potentials and auditory ERPs
were created and averaged for each condition.
Preaction potentials. Grand averages of preaction po-
tentials were defined in relation to the onset of the first
event in each condition (tone, self-made key press and full
depression of the observed key press). Mean amplitudes,
for each electrode of interest, were taken across six time
intervals of 150 msec each, beginning with 1400 msec
through to 500 msec before the onset of the first event.
The analyzed time windows ended at 500 msec because
we needed to exclude any event-related changes in
observe conditions because of the onset of the observed
action stimulus.
Electrodes were grouped together into a grid of nine
different locations across the scalp covering left/midline/
right and frontal/central/parietal regions. Pairs of electrodes
within each region were averaged together to further
improve ERP signal (Baker, Piriyapunyaporn, &Cunnington,
2012). The pairs of electrodes for each region were left
frontal (F1, F3), left central (FC3, C3), left parietal (CP3,
CP1), middle frontal (AFz, Fz), middle central (FCz, Cz),
middle parietal (Pz, CPz), right frontal (F2, F4), right central
(FC4, C4), and right parietal (CP4, CP2). This grid covered
premotor and motor areas, as well as parietal areas impor-
tant to both intentional self-made actions and the obser-
vation of actions. The amplitude of participantʼs preaction
potentials across electrode groups and time windows was
compared using a 3 (Condition) × 6 (Time window) ×
9 (Electrode group) repeated-measures ANOVA. Note that
our primary goal in this analysis was to identify significant
differences in ERP amplitudes between conditions, across
particular electrode sites, and not more broadly to assess
changes in scalp topography. Therefore, we did not nor-
malize ERPs across electrode regions for topographic anal-
ysis (e.g., McCarthy & Wood, 1985).
Auditory ERPs. Grand-averaged auditory ERPs were
created for all tone stimuli across the three conditions.
The four ERP conditions created included the first tone
in control conditions (first tone), the second tone in con-
trol conditions (second tone), the tone that followed a self-
made action (action tone), and the tone that followed an
observed action (observe tone).
Statistical analysis was conducted on two ERP compo-
nents for all participants across nine frontocentral elec-
trodes (F3, Fz, F4, C3, Cz, C4, CP3, CPz, CP4). For the N1
component, a 25-msec window centered around the peak
of the grand-averaged waveform for all conditions was used
(80–105 msec). For the P2 component, a 55-msec window
centered around the peak of the grand-averaged waveform
was used (145–200 msec). Mean amplitudes across these
time windows were calculated for each participant
and compared using two separate 4 (Condition) × 9
(Electrode) repeated-measures ANOVAs.
Results
Behavioral Results
Mean reproduction errors for the control, action, and
observe conditions are shown in Figure 2. Participants
appear to overestimate the interval between the two
tones in the control condition. In the action and observe
conditions, participants underestimated the interval
between the movement-related events by shortening
the perceived interval between an action (self-made or
observed) and its consequent tone.
A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA revealed that
reproduction errors significantly differed across Conditions,
F(2, 32) = 13.67, p < .001. Tests of simple effects revealed
significantly greater negative reproduction errors (shorter
estimated intervals) for the action condition (−125 msec)
compared with the control condition (84 msec, p = .001)
and for the observe condition (−99 msec) compared with
the control condition ( p = .006). No significant difference
in reproduction errors was found between the action and
observe conditions. These results indicate that, in both the
action and observe conditions, participants perceived the
interval between the key press and tone to be significantly
shorter than the interval between two tones.
EEG Results
Preaction potentials. In grand-averaged preaction po-
tentials, a slow-wave negativity in frontocentral electrodes
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was clearly evident before the onset of self-made actions
(Figure 3). However, no such rising negativity was found
before first tone onset and observed action.
A three-way repeated-measures ANOVA showed sig-
nificant main effects, revealing differences between ampli-
tudes of preaction potentials across Conditions, F(2, 32) =
6.00, p = .006, Electrode groups, F(8, 128) = 5.06, p <
.001, and Time windows, F(5, 80) = 3.91, p = .003. A sig-
nificant three-way interaction between Conditions, Time
windows, and Electrode groups was also found in ampli-
tudes for the preaction potential, F(80, 1280) = 10.31,
p < .001.
To investigate these amplitude differences between
conditions and electrode groups, we conducted follow-
up two-way ANOVAs for each time window. Two-way inter-
actions between Condition × Electrodes were found
across all time windows (for all comparisons p < .001).
Overall, comparisons of simple effects (using a Bonferroni
correction) revealed significantly greater negative activity
for the action condition compared with observe and con-
trol conditions. This difference was first evident in frontal
electrodes at 1400 msec before self-made movement and
later spread to central electrodes from 1100 to 500 msec
(all ps < .05).
As can be seen in Figure 3, this rising negativity con-
tinues on in the movement condition until movement
onset. We did not further analyze the conditions after the
500-msec time window because of interference between
the visual evoked potential elicited by the video of the
observed condition.
Our results indicate a rising slow-wave negative potential
(RP) in movement conditions; however, no such similar
potential (CNV) was found in either tone or observed
action conditions (before the video onset). These results
suggest that the binding found when observing and execut-
ing an action is not directly indexed by preaction/stimulus
activity in frontocentral electrodes.
Figure 3. Grand-averaged
preaction potentials across a
grid of 3 (left, midline, right) ×
3 (frontal, central, parietal)
groups of electrodes showing
slow-wave potentials from
1500 msec prior till the onset
of a tone (black), self-made
button press (green), and
observed button press (blue).
Negative amplitudes are
plotted upwards.
Figure 2. Mean reproduction error (and SEM ) in msec, calculated
as the difference between response interval and stimulus interval,
across control, self-made action, and observed action conditions.
In control conditions, participants overestimated the interval between
two sensory events, whereas in action and observe conditions, they
underestimated the interval between a self-made or observed
movement and a sensory event.
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Auditory ERPs. Grand-averaged auditory ERPs are
shown in Figure 4. The N1 component, a negative deflec-
tion peaking at 94 msec after tone onset, is evident across
all conditions and is largest for all conditions in midline
frontocentral electrodes. The amplitude of the N1 appears
to vary between conditions. The P2 component, a positive
deflection peaking at 175 msec after tone onset, is also
evident across all conditions and appears to vary between
the control tone condition and the remaining conditions.
We further investigated these amplitude differences in
each component, using two separate ANOVAs.
A two-way repeated-measures ANOVA showed signifi-
cant main effects, revealing differences in amplitude for
the N1 component across Conditions, F(3, 48) = 19.10,
p < .001, and Electrodes, F(8, 128) = 63.90, p < .001. A
significant two-way interaction between Condition and
Electrode was found between amplitudes for the N1
component, F(24, 384) = 6.13, p < .001. To investigate
these differences in amplitudes between the conditions,
we conducted pairwise comparisons (using a Bonferroni
correction) between conditions for each electrode. For
the N1 component (peak = 97 msec) frontocentral elec-
trodes located on the left (FC3, C3) and middle of the
scalp (FCz, Cz, and CPz) all showed the same pattern
of results. Across these electrodes, the first tone in the
control condition had significantly greater negative ampli-
tudes compared with all the other conditions (all ps <
.05). The tones presented in both the observe and action
conditions were also greater in amplitude than the second
tone in the control condition (all ps < .05). Across the
right side electrodes (FC4, C4, CP4), no difference in
amplitude was found between the first tone and tones
in both the observe and action conditions; however, there
was still a difference between first tone and second tone
in the control conditions across these electrodes ( p <
.05). In electrodes CP3, FC4, and C4, the amplitude in
observe conditions was greater than that for the second
tone in the control condition ( p < .05), whereas in CP4
it was the amplitude in the action condition that was
significantly greater than the second tone in the control
condition ( p < .05). Across all electrodes, no difference
was found in amplitude for the N1 component between
observe and action conditions.
For the P2 component (peak = 175 msec), a two-way
repeated-measures ANOVA significant main effects, reveal-
ing differences in amplitude across Conditions, F(3, 48) =
24.07, p < .001, and Electrodes, F(8, 128) = 47.57, p <
.001. A significant two-way interaction between Condition
and Electrode was found between amplitudes for the P2
component, F(24, 384) = 3.46, p < .001. Bonferroni-
corrected pairwise comparisons between conditions for
each electrode showed the same pattern of results. The
second tone in control conditions had a significantly
smaller positive amplitude than all other conditions (first
tone, action, and observe; p < .05). No significant differ-
ences were found between first tone, action, or observe
conditions in any electrode.
Our results indicate that presentation of a first tone
results in a large N1, which decreases in amplitude when
tones are the consequent of a previous event. Both exe-
cuting and observing an action before the onset of a tone
results in a reduction of the amplitude of the N1, but not
to the same extent as a tone that was preceded by another
tone. The N1 suppression in action and observe conditions
Figure 4. (A) Grand-averaged auditory ERP from a grid of central electrodes for first (control) tone, action tone, observe tone and second (control)
tone events. (B) Grand-averaged auditory ERP for Cz electrode showing the N1–P2 components for each condition. Between all of the conditions,
the tones that were first presented in the control task had the greatest N1 amplitude, with action and observe tones showing suppression of
the N1 (decrease in N1 amplitude), and second (observe) tones with the smallest N1 amplitude. (C) Topography maps showing mean amplitude
differences for the N1 (left) and P2 (right) component between the first tone in the control task and the action caused tone (top), the observed
caused tone (middle), and the second tone in the control task (bottom). Negative differences (blue) show that there were similar amplitude
differences in the N1 component for both observe and action tones. This difference occurs predominantly over frontocentral electrodes located
around the midline and toward the left side of the head.
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is predominantly over midline and left electrodes, suggest-
ing a relationship between auditory processing of the tone
and the hand of action or, in the observed video, the visual
field where the hand appeared (right side). These results
suggest that, when a tone is presented as a consequence
of an action (self-made or observed), the neural response
to the tone is reduced. Crucially, this amplitude reduction
is the same regardless of whether actions are self-made or
observed.
EXPERIMENT 2
Methods
Participants
Twenty-four right-handed participants (five men, age
range = 19–26 years, mean = 20.95 years) with no
known neurological disease or psychiatric conditions
provided written informed consent to participate in this
event-related EEG experiment. Two data sets were re-
jected for failing to reach the threshold for included trials
following the EEG artifact rejection (±120 μV). All analy-
ses were conducted on the remaining 22 data sets. The
study was approved by the University of Queensland
medical research ethics committee (UQ Project No.
2008000703).
Procedure
To investigate the N1 suppression found in observed ac-
tions more closely, a control experiment was conducted
using visual–auditory events. Participants completed a
similar interval-estimation task as in Experiment 1, but
comparing four different types of visual–auditory stimuli
(Figure 5). In the control condition (tone only), partici-
pants were presented with an image of a keyboard
(Frame 1). After a psuedorandom time interval (500–
1500 msec), a single auditory tone was presented and
no response was required. This condition was included
to elicit an ERP response related to tones in the absence
of actions (equivalent to the first tone of the control con-
dition in Experiment 1). In the remaining three condi-
tions, participants were presented with a video clip
(presented as a set of 38 bitmap images presented in
rapid succession) showing a key depression that was
caused by either an agent, no agent, or paired with an
unrelated action.
The observed action condition was identical to the ob-
served condition of Experiment 1. In an unrelated action
condition, a hand appeared from the right side of the
screen at image (Frame 5), moved approximately 15–20 cm
above the keyboard without touching it, and returned to
exit the screen (Frame 36). While this action was occurring,
the space bar on the keyboard depressed in a similar way to
the key press in the observed action condition (Frame 19).
In the no action condition, the image of a key depressing
occurred by itself with no hand or other agentʼs action
present at any time. For each condition, an auditory tone
was presented after a psuedorandom interval between
500 and 1500 msec after the image of the key depression
was shown. At the end of the trial, participants were
required to recreate the stimulus interval between the
key press and tone by holding down the space bar for
the length of time they perceived the interval to have
lasted, identical to Experiment 1. Two trials of each con-
dition were presented in a random order in each block,
with a total of 108 trials per condition presented in the
entire experiment. All other stimuli were identical to the
previous experiment.
Figure 5. Interval estimation task for Experiment 2. Participants were presented with a video clip showing a key depression that was caused by
either an observed action (A), paired with an unrelated action (B), or occurred with no action (C). After a psuedorandom interval (500–1500 msec),
an auditory tone was presented and participants were required to estimate the length of time between the key press and the consequent tone. In a
tone-only control condition (D), the image of the keyboard was presented on screen, and a single auditory tone was presented after a variable
interval.
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EEG Acquisition and Analysis
EEG recordings and analyses were conducted using the same
software and hardware as outlined in the previous experi-
ment. The raw EEG data were referenced to the average ref-
erence for all conditions and electrodes. Blink artifacts were
corrected for each participant using a filter, based on spatial
topography (Berg& Scherg, 1994), with low-pass (45Hz) and
high-pass (0.1Hz) filters applied to eachparticipantʼs data set.
Auditory ERP epochs started at 500 msec before and went
through to 1000 msec after tone onset. Baseline correction
was conducted on a window between 100 and 0msec before
tone onset. Epochs were rejected if they contained artifacts
caused by poor signal ormovement (artifact rejection thresh-
old: ±120 μV), with each data set needing to contain at
least 75 artifact-free epochs per condition. Two partici-
pantsʼ data were excluded for not reaching these criteria.
Grand averages of the auditory ERP were created across
each condition. The N1 component was analyzed by taking
the average of three central midline electrodes (Fz, FCz,
and Cz). These midline electrodes were selected as they
centered aroundFCz,whichwas the electrodewith the peak
amplitude from the previous experiment. N1 amplitudes
were calculated as themean amplitudes over a 30-msec time
window centered around the peak in the grand average,
from 85 to 115 msec. The amplitude of the N1 component
for the observed action conditionwas then compared, using
Bonferroni (multiple comparison)-corrected t tests, to each
of the other conditions. This analysis specifically tested
whether N1 suppression for the consequent auditory event
was greater when the key press was caused by an agent
executing a goal-directed action rather than the key de-
pression alone or when paired with an unrelated action.
Results
Grand-averaged auditory ERPs for electrode FCz are
shown in Figure 6A, and the amplitude of the N1 compo-
nent is shown Figure 6B. A set of pairwise t tests were
used to compare the amplitude of the N1 component
in the observed action condition to all other conditions.
The N1 amplitude was significantly lower (greater sup-
pression) for the observed action condition (−6.9 μV)
compared with the tone-only condition (−9.95 μV, t(20) =
3.88, p= .001), the no action condition (−8.01 μV, t(20) =
3.38, p= .003), and the unrelated action condition (−7.78 μV,
t(20) = 2.70, p = .014). These results clearly indicate that
N1 suppression to consequent tones is greatest for tones
caused by observed goal-directed actions of another agent,
rather than similar visual events that do not involve causal
or goal-directed actions.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we aimed to investigate the neural processes
that index the causal attribution between actions and
effects in both self-made and observed actions. To do this,
we measured EEG activity while participants performed
an intentional binding task. We found greater reductions
in the estimated interval between actions and effects for
both types of action, demonstrating intentional binding
for our own and othersʼ actions. Our results demonstrated
N1 suppression over left frontocentral and midline sites for
auditory stimuli that were preceded by either type of action
(self-made or observed), with no significant difference in
N1 amplitude reduction for tones caused by our own and
othersʼ actions. We also found a slow-rising negativity (RP)
over frontocentral electrodes before the execution of a
self-made action; however, we failed to find a slow-rising
negativity indicative of anticipation of a stimulus (CNV) in
either observe or control conditions. In a second study,
we also found that N1 suppression was greatest for tones
that were caused by an observed agent executing a goal-
directed action, compared with similar visual events that
did not involve causal or goal-directed actions. Our results
Figure 6. (A) The auditory
ERP at FCz for each condition.
Suppression of the N1
component amplitude was
evident for all key press
conditions compared with
the tone-only condition (black).
(B) Mean N1 amplitudes
across conditions. Overall,
the lowest N1 amplitude
(greatest suppression) was
found in the observed action
condition (blue) compared
with all other conditions
(* indicates significant
differences, p < .016).
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demonstrate that the N1 component is suppressed when
an auditory stimulus is preceded by a causal action (either
observed or executed), whereas anticipatory activity
from frontocentral sites before the onset of an observed
action does not appear to be necessary for intentional
binding in othersʼ actions and may not directly index
the neural processes involved in this phenomenon.
Our main finding shows that auditory consequences
caused by observed actions result in N1 suppression that
is not significantly different from that caused by our own
actions. Using a behavioral measure of implicit agency,
we again found that observed actions and self-made
actions resulted in a decrease in the perceived interval
between actions and consequences, indicative of inten-
tional binding (Poonian & Cunnington, 2013). Our results
are supported by previous investigations, which have
determined that N1 suppression occurs when tones are
judged as caused by ourselves (Gentsch et al., 2012;
Gentsch & Schutz-Bosbach, 2011; Kuhn et al., 2011).
Our finding that N1 suppression of the auditory ERP occurs
when the tone is preceded by observing another person
making a goal-directed action suggests that similar cog-
nitive mechanisms are involved in the causal attribution
we make between both self-made and observed actions
and their sensory consequences. In both self-made and
observed actions, there is a growing body of research
suggesting that N1 suppression to auditory consequences
occurs as a result of predictions about the consequence
of the action (Hughes et al., 2013; Gentsch et al., 2012;
Stekelenburg & Vroomen, 2012; Bass et al., 2008;
van Wassenhove et al., 2005). Taken together, we suggest
that the N1 suppression for tones caused by an action (self-
made or observed) is because of the implicit feeling of
agency that is elicited when making our own actions and
when watching another person cause changes to the
sensory environment. Our finding is the first evidence that
N1 suppression of the auditory ERP occurs to the same
extent in conditions where the tone is caused by the self
or another and is reflected in a behavioral measure of
implicit agency.
It could be argued that the N1 suppression we found in
consequences that are caused by an observed or executed
action may not be because of predictions within an inter-
nal model of action processing, but because of temporal
prediction, auditory/visual integration, or repetition sup-
pression. Previous research has found decreased N1
amplitudewith tones that are predictable in time (Sowman,
Kuusik, & Johnson, 2012; Ford, Gray, Faustman, Roach, &
Mathalon, 2007). A recent study investigated this more
closely and found that temporal prediction is not the sole
reason that N1 suppression occurs when a self-made tone
is processed (Lange, 2011). Our study supports this as our
consequent tones were at variable times in relation to the
first event; however, we still found N1 suppression for
temporally unpredictable tones.
It is also possible that the N1 suppression found in our
observed condition is a result of the tone being preceded
by a visual stimulus in general rather than specifically by
the video of an observed action. Tasks involving audio-
visual integration have been found to have different
impacts on the amplitude of the N1 in comparison with
unimodal auditory ERPs. In some tasks, the N1 is greater
for auditory ERPs when preceded by a visual event (Giard
& Peronnet, 1999), whereas in other tasks no difference is
found in early components of the auditory ERP when audi-
tory and visual stimuli are presented together (Senkowski,
Saint-Amour, Kelly, & Foxe, 2007). Recently, N1 suppres-
sion was found when an auditory event was preceded by
a visual event, but not when there was a delay in synchro-
nicity between auditory and visual events (Vroomen &
Stekelenburg, 2010), suggesting that N1 suppression in
visual–auditory tasks is because of a causal relationship
between the auditory–visual stimuli. We conducted the
second experiment to investigate this more closely by com-
paring the amplitude of the N1 auditory ERP when the
tones followed different types of visual stimuli. We found
that the greatest N1 suppression occurred for auditory
consequences that followed a key press caused by another
agent executing a goal-directed action, compared with a
key press paired with an unrelated action or with no action.
We suggest that the N1 suppression found in tones caused
by an observed action is related to the presence of a visual,
biological motion stimulus executing a goal-directed action
that results in an auditory event.
In regard to the second tone in control conditions, this
auditory ERP resulted in large decreases in amplitude for
both the N1 and P2 component in relation to the other
tone conditions. We believe that the suppression of the
consequent tone in control conditions is because of rep-
etition suppression effects, which occur when cortical
responses are decreased for repeated stimuli (Costa-
Faidella, Baldeweg, Grimm, & Escera, 2011; Ulanovsky,
Las, Farkas, & Nelken, 2004). In our control condition,
the first and second tones were identical in frequency,
which would explain why we found such a large decrease
in amplitude for both the N1 and P2 components. This
decrease in the P2 component was not found for tones
caused by either action condition. Because of the differ-
ences in amplitude and electrode locations we measured
between action-related tones and consequent tones in
the control task, we believe that the suppression found
in the second tone in the control task involves different
mechanisms to those for action-related tones. Overall,
comparing our results with previous research leads us to
conclude that the N1 suppression for the action-related
tones is not because of temporal predictability, multi-
modal integration, or repetition suppression. We instead
propose that the N1 suppression of action-related tones
is evidence of top–down predictions about whether an
action results in a consequent tone, resulting in reduc-
tions in auditory cortical firing.
In addition, we did not find any P2 suppression for
tones that were preceded by an action. It has been hypoth-
esized that reductions in P2 amplitude are because of
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conscious processing of the action-related sound (Knolle
et al., 2013). Results vary in whether self-initiated sounds
result in suppression of the P2 component (Knolle et al.,
2013; Horvath, Maess, Baess, & Toth, 2012; Knolle,
Schroger, Baess, & Kotz, 2012; Sowman et al., 2012) or
not (Bass et al., 2008; Martikainen et al., 2005). We found
no P2 suppression for both types of action-related tones,
similar to other studies that found no difference in P2
amplitude to tones caused by self-made actions (Bass
et al., 2008; Martikainen et al., 2005). It may be that because
of our task being a measure of implicit agency, the dif-
ferential effects were only found on the earlier N1 compo-
nent. It is also possible that later processes involved in the
conscious detection of agency may have differential effects
on action tones and observed tones. In fact it appears that
the judgment of self-agency does affect later components
such as P3a but not the N1 (Kuhn et al., 2011). Recent work
has also found that auditory events caused by another
agent are perceived differently, with less perceptual atten-
uation, than auditory events caused by the self (Weiss &
Schutz-Bosbach, 2012; Weiss, Herwig, & Schutz-Bosbach,
2011). In our results, we only investigated early ERP com-
ponents, indicative of the attribution of agency between
movement and sensory events. Our results suggest that
the attribution of agency is generalizable not just to our-
selves but also to other biological agents, as well as provid-
ing further support that early components of the sensory
ERP relate to implicit attributions of agency.
We also examined activity leading up to the onset of an
action, which is thought to provide evidence for anticipa-
tory processes during the execution and observation of
an action. We found no slow-rising negativity before an
observed action, suggesting that preaction potentials,
either a RP or a CNV, do not index intentional binding.
We found no anticipated activity before the onset of
the observed video, although the expected time of the
video was at a fixed interval, it may be that the pre-SMA
plays a differential role in binding of self-made actions to
their consequences and observed actions to their sensory
consequences. As intentional binding is evident in both
self-made and observed actions, it may be that pre-SMA
is part of a larger network involved in the awareness of
our actions. Our results may also indicate that predictions
for our own and observed actions involve different pro-
cesses for binding an action to a sensory consequence
and thus involves different anatomical areas. This action
awareness network may include cerebellum and parietal
cortex, areas that are thought to be involved in the pre-
diction about intentions for both self-made and others
(Knolle et al., 2012; Desmurget & Sirigu, 2009). Taken
with our findings, we suggest that preaction activity may
not be an index of the binding that occurs in general be-
tween actions and their consequences but may be specific
for binding between self-made actions and their effects.
Together, our results suggest that the sensory con-
sequences of observed actions and self-made actions
are processed in a similar way. We found that both self-
made and observed actions involve implicit agency, with
similar levels of binding, and result in similar effects on
the neural response to the sensory consequence of the
action. In a control experiment, we further showed that
N1 suppression occurs for sensory consequences that are
caused by another agent executing a goal-directed action.
In contrast, activity before the onset of actions did not
correspond with binding found in observed actions. We
suggest that the N1 suppression during executed and ob-
served action-effect tasks is because of top–down processes
and, in particular, predictions about the consequences of
an action within an internal comparator model. These
expectations about events help us unconsciously make
sense and predict the consequences of our own and
othersʼ interactions with the world.
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